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DO PRESUMED-CONSENT LAWS RAISE ORGAN
PROCUREMENT RATES?
Kieran Healy*
INTRODUCTION
Gift-giving and voluntary donation are the standard ways of ob-
taining transplant organs, particularly hearts and lungs that must come
from the dead. t Yet this gift-exchange does not happen everywhere in
the same way or to the same extent. Despite the universality of volun-
tary donation, there is considerable cross-national variation in donor
procurement rates. Some countries do much better than others. This
variability has not received the attention it deserves, partly because
the dominant ethical and policy debates focus on the relative merits of
voluntary versus market systems. This has had two consequences.
First, these debates tend to draw a sharp contrast between gift- and
market-based systems, encouraging us to think in terms of a clear
choice between the two. The assumption is that once the overall ex-
change system is fixed, certain consequences for the volume and com-
position of the supply will tend to follow, more or less directly.
Second, there is a tendency for debates about systems to become de-
bates about motives-arguments about gift versus market exchange
turn into discussions of altruistic versus selfish individuals. Of course,
systems and motives are not unrelated-institutions may be character-
ized by the incentives they provide. They may attract different sorts
of individuals to participate in them, or elicit different responses from
the same kinds of individuals.2 But in general, an overly sharp distinc-
tion between exchange systems will tend to mislead us, as will an
overly narrow focus on individual motivations. The performance of
actually existing systems of organ procurement varies widely. This
* Sociology Department, University of Arizona; kjhealy@arizona.edu.
1. Donation is also the main source of organs from living donors, a growing illegal trade in
organ sales notwithstanding. See Lawrence Cohen, Where It Hurts: Indian Material for an Eth-
ics of Organ Transplantation, 128 DAEDALUS 135 (1999) (providing accounts of the black market
in organs); Nancy Scheper-Hughes, The Global Traffic in Human Organs, 41 CURRENT ANTHRO-
POLOGY 191 (2000) (providing accounts of the black market in organs).
2. See generally JULIAN LE GRAND, MOTIVATION, AGENCY, AND PUBLIC POLICY: OF
KNIGHTS AND KNAVES, PAWNS AND QUEENS (2003); Bruno S. Frey, A Constitution for Knaves
Crowds Out Civic Virtues, 107 ECON. J. 1043 (1997).
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Article traces this variability to its roots in structural and organiza-
tional differences between systems rather than differences in individ-
ual dispositions to give.
This Article presents a comparative study of rates of cadaveric or-
gan procurement in seventeen countries (belonging to the Organiza-
tion for Economic Co-Operation and Development, or OECD)
between 1990 and 2002. Although the experiences of other countries
are sometimes drawn on in debates about transplant policy in the
United States, this typically happens in a piecemeal or anecdotal way.
Spain is the country most commonly cited in the English-speaking
literature because it has high rates of organ procurement and a differ-
ent legal regime from the United States. In the "Spanish Model," pre-
sumed-consent laws nominally allow donor organs to be procured
over the objections of the donor's family or next of kin. Advocates of
a presumed-consent solution in the United States and Britain point to
Spain's high rate of donation as evidence that such a system works,
and argue that other countries have also successfully implemented this
model. While these arguments rely on claims about macro-level out-
comes (such as differences in procurement rates), they quickly be-
come bioethical disagreements over the autonomy of donors and the
proper role of families. The ethical issues are difficult and important,
but they should not cause us to forget the underlying empirical ques-
tions. Is it really true, for instance, that presumed-consent laws elicit
more donors? Do they actually work in the manner claimed by their
advocates? By analyzing variation in procurement rates across coun-
tries and over time, we can make progress towards answering these
questions in terms of the particular experiences of different societies.
In the process, I hope to demonstrate the value of a broadly socio-
logical approach to questions of organ procurement and donation.
Modern debate about exchange in human goods begins with Richard
Titmuss's The Gift Relationship, the classic study of the blood supply
in Britain and the United States.3 Titmuss was concerned with the
organizational and institutional conditions needed to ensure a safe
and adequate blood supply. His argument emphasized the relation-
ship between individual motives and the broader context of exchange,
whether created by the state (in the United Kingdom) or by the pres-
ence of for-profit sales (in the United States). 4 But the promise of
3. See RICHARD M. TiTMuss, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL
POLICY (1971).
4. Thus, for Titmuss, "the ways in which society organizes and structures its social institutions
... can encourage or discourage the altruistic in man," id. at 225, and Britain's voluntary dona-
tion system allowed people to "signitfy] their belief in the willingness of other men to act altruis-
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Titmuss's comparative approach was not realized in the debate that
followed the book's publication. Instead, The Gift Relationship be-
came best known for its main finding that altruistic donation was safer
and more efficient than for-profit donation. The implicit idea that al-
ternative ways of organizing the blood supply might lead to widely
differing national outcomes-even when most systems were nominally
gift-based-was not systematically pursued.
We know, however, that rates of blood and organ procurement vary
widely. It is also clear that neither form of donation (especially organ
donation) could happen without an elaborate organizational and insti-
tutional apparatus, regardless of the general willingness of individuals
to donate. We should therefore examine the social organization of
exchange in organs, focusing on how procurement agencies systemati-
cally create opportunities to give and work to produce a public under-
standing of why donation is worthwhile. While I develop, defend, and
apply this idea at greater length elsewhere, 5 here I examine one aspect
of it-namely the role of the legal environment in producing the or-
gan supply. The law must obviously play some role-if market trans-
fers are illegal, the law will clearly affect the composition of the
supply, and perhaps also its size. In the case of cadaveric organ dona-
tion, countries differ mainly in the way the law says the consent of
donors must be obtained. This Article explores how these laws affect
procurement rates.
II. THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF PROCUREMENT
Cadaveric organ donation is generally thought of as a matter of in-
dividual altruism, but it can only happen in certain highly organized
circumstances, subject to very tight logistical constraints. This makes
it a distinctive kind of voluntary action. Despite the overwhelming
emphasis on the motives and personal characteristics of individual do-
nors and donor families, both in popular coverage of donation and the
research literature, it makes more sense to treat donation as a pro-
curement or resource-extraction problem faced by the organizations
responsible for the organ supply. From this perspective, all organ pro-
curement organizations (OPOs) face a similar set of constraints. Acci-
dent victims and other transplant candidates must be transported to
hospitals quickly if they are not already there. Hospitals need to be
able to deal with critically ill or brain-dead patients and quickly iden-
tically in the future, and to combine together to make a gift freely available should they have a
need for it." Id. at 239.
5. See KIERAN HEALY, LAST BEST GIFTS: ALTRUISM AND THE MARKET FOR HUMAN BLOOD
AND ORGANS (forthcoming 2006).
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tify potential donors. Procedures need to be in place for stabilizing
the condition of donor candidates and determining that brain death
has occurred. Procurement teams must be available to confirm that
donation is a possibility, obtain consent from the relevant individuals
(most often the next of kin), and carry out the required surgery. Once
procured, organs must be distributed quickly to patients awaiting
transplants. All of this must happen in a very short period of time.
These demands entail a complex infrastructure, which in turn presup-
poses a considerable amount of investment in personnel, equipment,
and organization.
While the logistical constraints are universal, each constraint opens
up the possibility of variation because different organizations and
health systems will produce different solutions. Medical systems will
be more or less well funded and well managed; procedures will be
more or less useful and followed to a greater or lesser degree; person-
nel will be trained in different ways or have different concerns.
Evidence of cross-national variation in donation rates is sometimes
cited in public policy debates about transplantation in the United
States and, recently, in Britain.6 Specifically, the fact that countries
with high rates of organ procurement also have presumed-consent
laws is a common trope in debates about the future of organ donation.
The distinction between presumed consent and informed consent is
the most directly observable difference between national procurement
systems. In the next section I describe these legal regimes and assess
the extent of our knowledge about them. I then describe cross-na-
tional variation in procurement rates and the forces-including these
laws-that might be responsible for differences between countries.
A. Presumed- and Informed-Consent Laws
The idea of presumed consent is clear enough in principle. In the
absence of a clear prior statement to the contrary from the potential
donor, the law assumes that consent for procurement has already been
given.7 Those who do not wish to be organ donors after their death
must make a choice in advance to opt out of the procurement process
and sign on to a central registry of nonparticipants. Procurement
coordinators check this registry when faced with a potential cadaveric
6. The Parliament in Britain recently debated the possibility of introducing a presumed-con-
sent system. Supporters pointed to the experience of Spain and Belgium. See PARLIAMENTARY
OFF. ScL. & TECH., No. 231, Postnote: Organ Transplants (Oct. 2004), available at www.parlia-
ment.uk/post (discussing this debate).
7. The following two paragraphs sketch the general form of presumed-consent and informed-
consent laws. For details on (and references to) the specific statutes in the countries under
study, see infra tbl. 1 and accompanying notes.
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donor in a hospital. The main consequence of a presumed-consent
law is that there is (in principle) no need to look for evidence that the
donor supported the idea of organ donation-consent is assumed, ab-
sent a recorded decision to opt out.
The most important implication of this view is that the donor's next
of kin should no longer play a role in the procurement decision. In its
pure form, a presumed-consent system works by taking the potential
donor's decision as sovereign and then switching the "default setting"
for this decision to "yes." The latter move can be justified on the utili-
tarian grounds that it should result in more donors. But supporters
also point out that public opinion surveys typically find a high degree
of support for organ donation in principle. Where no recorded objec-
tion exists-and subject to some conditions like making the option to
opt out easy to pursue-it is therefore reasonable to assume that a
potential donor supported the idea of donation.
In an informed-consent system such as that in the United States, by
contrast, neither of these assumptions is made. Donors must opt in to
the system. More importantly, even the choice to opt in (for instance,
by signing an organ donor card) is generally not sufficient for procure-
ment to take place. The consent of the next of kin or donor family is
almost always required, assuming they can be found.8 Refusal of con-
sent by donor families results in a substantial loss in donated organs. 9
The possibility of removing the family from the decision process is
therefore attractive to some transplant advocates. They argue that a
presumed-consent system would better respect the wishes of the do-
nor, as it is not uncommon for grieving families to refuse consent to
donate even when there is evidence that the candidate would have
wanted to donate his or her organs, especially when families do not
know in advance of the prospective donor's wishes. 10
8. Since the early part of this decade, a majority of U.S. states have had "First Person Con-
sent" (FPC) laws. These allow hospitals to proceed with procurement over the wishes of the
family provided the donor has designated his or her preference on a driver's license or state
donor registry. In practice, many OPOs still respect the wishes of the family, though the precise
manner in which procurement teams make their requests may have become more direct since
the iupeinntaiuio of tihes laws. See United Netwuik for Organ Sharing, Donor Designation
(First Person Consent) Status by State, http://www.unos.org/resources/factsheets.asp?fs=6 (last
visited Jan. 4, 2006).
9. Laura A. Siminoff et al., Factors Influencing Families' Consent for Donation of Solid Or-
gans for Transplantation, 286 JAMA 71 (2001).
10. See id. at 74 tbl.1. Siminoff and her colleagues found that if the donor's family already
knew that the prospective donor carried a donor card, then the consent rate was close to ninety
percent. Id. But if the prospective donor carried a card and the family only learned of this
during the request process, almost forty percent refused consent. Id.
2006] 1021
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It is important to note that the role of the next of kin complicates
both presumed-consent and informed-consent systems. A fully real-
ized system of informed consent would employ a national "opt-in"
register. Everyone would be required to make an informed decision
about whether he or she wanted to become a donor if the circum-
stances ever arose (i.e., after death) and have it recorded and wit-
nessed in a legally binding way. Under such a system, the next of kin's
wishes should not play a role either, as the donors themselves would
have made their own decisions in advance. Signing a donor card (or a
form on the back of a driver's license) in the presence of a witness
should provide enough information about the informed consent of po-
tential donors. But in practice, the signature of the potential donor is
not decisive. The United States is typical of informed-consent coun-
tries in that the donor's next of kin will make the final decision. Al-
though procurement coordinators may point to any available evidence
about what the potential donor would have wanted, in general they
will not act against the wishes of the family-even if they would tech-
nically be within their rights to do so. They fear a violent backlash
against transplantation led by families whose wishes were not
followed.
The organizational obstacle to a fully realized informed-consent sys-
tem is that it is impractical to require everyone to make his or her
choice in advance and then efficiently keep track of those decisions.
Most people do not consider it likely that they will be killed in a car
crash or other sudden accident. For this reason it is difficult to get
people to think seriously about the issue in advance. It is also difficult
to assume that their consent is fully informed in some relevant sense
when they quickly fill out the paperwork while in line for a driver's
license. The Netherlands comes closest to a fully realized informed-
consent system. Almost one-third of the population is on the donor
registry, and recorded wishes carry more weight than the family's ob-
jections, although the latter are still considered.
Supporters of presumed-consent laws argue that the default deci-
sion in informed-consent countries needs to be shifted. This is partly
because it is more convenient to put the burden on people to opt out
rather than to find a feasible way to make everyone opt in, partly be-
cause it might better respect the weight of public opinion, and partly
because removing the next of kin from the consent process might
boost donation rates. Advocates for presumed consent argue that
other countries have successfully implemented this kind of policy. For
example, the U. S.-based Presumed Consent Foundation claims: "Pre-
sumed Consent works well in other countries where it has been insti-
[Vol. 55:10171022
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tuted-Austria, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Belgium, Bulgaria, France,
Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland,
Latvia, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Poland,
Greece, and Singapore.""
Despite these claims, systematic, comparative analysis of organ pro-
curement rates is almost nonexistent. 12 It is not even clear whether
presumed-consent countries really do bypass the next of kin in the
procurement process. On the issue of presumed consent, then, three
important questions need answering. First, which countries operate
procurement systems where the law, at least nominally, implements
presumed consent? Second, how do these laws work in practice? And
third, how much of a country's success in organ procurement is in fact
attributable to its legal consent regime? It may be doing most of the
work, or it might be that other features of a country's institutions, the
beliefs and attitudes of its population, or general environmental fac-
tors beyond the control of a procurement organization are
responsible.
There is a stronger and a weaker sense in which a country might be
said to have a presumed-consent system. In the stronger option, doc-
tors would be granted two powers. First, they could presume the con-
sent of any donor who has not formally opted out of the system in
advance (by adding his or her name to a registry of nonparticipants,
for instance). Therefore, no further checking into the wishes of the
deceased is required. Second, once consent had been established in
this way, doctors could procure organs even over the objections of the
donor's family or next of kin. In this case, the presumed-consent law
simplifies the procurement process by placing the onus on potential
donors to signal their unwillingness to participate and by removing the
family from the donation process. This is the sort of law that advo-
cates and critics generally have in mind when they discuss the possibil-
ity of introducing presumed-consent legislation in the United States.
The weaker option would only grant the first of these powers. Con-
sent is presumed only in the sense that the default option is moved
from "no" (or perhaps "ask") to "yes." But the next of kin still par-
ticipate in the process, and may decide to veto procurement if they
wish. R.M. Veatch and J.B. Pitt have argued that most presumed-con-
11. Presumed Consent Foundation, Solutions, http://www.presumedconsent.org/solutions.htm
(last visited Jan. 10, 2006).
12. Two notable exceptions are Ronald W. Gimbel et al., Presumed Consent and Other
Predictors of Cadaveric Organ Donation in Europe, 13 PROGRESS IN TRANSPLANTATION 17
(2003), and Leo Roels & Johan De Meester, The Relative Impact of Presumed-Consent Legisla-
tion on Thoracic Organ Donation in the Eurotransplant Area, 6 J. TRANSPLANTATION COORDI-
NATION 174 (1996).
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sent systems actually take this second form, and so should be called
"required request" or "routine salvaging" systems instead.' 3 The
available evidence supports this claim. Table 1 summarizes consent
law and other available information about donor registration and pro-
curement practice for seventeen OECD countries. The first column
shows the nominal legal regime, as defined by each country's law gov-
erning organ donation and transplantation. 14 The second and third
columns show available information about donor registries. Both
pure informed-consent and presumed-consent systems could have full
donor registries, but this is not always (or even usually) the case. No
country has a fully comprehensive registry of any kind, opt-in or opt-
out. The fourth column shows information on whether "required re-
quest" laws exist, and the final column shows whether the wishes of
the next of kin may, in practice, determine the outcome of the pro-
curement process.
13. See R.M. Veatch & IB. Pitt, The Myth of Presumed Consent: Ethical Problems in New
Organ Procurement Strategies, 27 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 1888 (1995).
14. Switzerland is the only case that is difficult to classify. While it has a national informed-
consent law, a majority of Cantons (fifteen of twenty-three) have presumed-consent laws. Here
I classify it with the presumed-consent countries. Blank entries mean information was not
available.
[Vol. 55:10171024
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TABLE 1
ORGAN PROCUREMENT REGIMES FOR
OECD COUNTRIES 15
1025
SELECTED
Legal Registry Population Required
Country Regime Type Covered (%) Request Kin Veto
Australia Informed Yes 24 - Yes
Austria Presumed Only No 0.05 Yes No
Belgium Presumed No and Yes 2 No Yes
Canada Informed Only Yes - - Yes
Denmark Informed Yes and No 4.25 Yes -
Finland Presumed .-..
France Presumed Only No 0.05 Yes Yes
Germany Informed Pending - - Yes
Ireland Informed 16  None - - Yes
Italy Presumed Yes and No - Yes Yes
Netherlands Informed Yes and No 29 Yes Yes t 7
Norway Presumed None - - Yes
Spain Presumed - - - Yes
Sweden Presumed Yes and No 13 Yes Yes
Switzerland Presumed 1 8  -..
U.K. Informed Only Yes 15 No Yes
U.S.A. Informed Only Yes Yes Yes
All informed-consent countries have an effective kin veto, regard-
less of their donor registry system. It turns out, however, that the
same is true of almost all presumed-consent countries. They, too, gen-
erally allow the family to refuse consent. Austria is the only country
with a strong-form presumed-consent system, where family or next of
kin have no involvement in the procurement decision.' 9 After Aus-
15. The information from Table 1 was compiled from various sources. See WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION (1994); H. GAbel,
Donor Registries Throughout Europe and Their Influence on Organ Donation, 35
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 997 (2003); Gabriele Wolfslast, Comparative European Legislation on
Organ Procurement, 13 BAILLIFRE'S CLINICAL ANAESTHESIOLOGY 117 (1999); see also natinnal
organ donation agency websites.
16. Ireland has adopted informed consent, but has no law requiring such a policy.
17. If a donor is registered, the family's wishes carry less weight.
18. See supra note 14.
19. See R.D. Fitzgerald et al., Support for Organ Procurement: National, Professional, and
Religious Correlates Among Medical Personnel in Austria and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 34
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 3042 (2002); see also Maureen McCunn et al., Impact of Culture and
Policy on Organ Donation: A Comparison Between Two Urban Trauma Centers in Developed
Nations, 54 J. TRAUMA INJ. INFECTION & CRITICAL CARE 995 (2003).
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tria, Belgium's practices are the next strongest. It has a strong pre-
sumed-consent system which nevertheless does allow the next of kin a
role in the procurement proces3. 20  In other countries-notably
France, Norway, Sweden, and Italy-the de jure presumed-consent
system still nevertheless allows a de facto kin veto.
Table 1 shows right away that the most straightforward story about
presumed consent cannot be true. If almost all presumed-consent
countries in fact allow the next of kin to refuse consent for donation,
then any success in procurement cannot be due simply to a law that
permits doctors to override the wishes of families during the donation
process. With this in mind, we can still ask whether it is in fact the
case that presumed-consent countries do better than informed-con-
sent countries. Presumed-consent laws may still play an important
role, even if it is not the one advocates imagine.
B. Cross-National Trends in Procurement Rates
Procurement rates show substantial cross-national and longitudinal
variation. Figure 1 shows the number of cadaveric donors per million
population for seventeen, advanced capitalist democracies between
1990 and 2002. Countries with informed-consent laws are shown in
the top row and presumed-consent countries are on the bottom.
Countries are organized by average procurement rate in each row,
from lowest to highest reading left to right. The scale of each panel in
the figure is the same, so trends are directly comparable across
countries.
National procurement rates vary in the volatility of the time trend
(its tendency to bounce around from year to year), the pattern of rela-
tive growth or decline over time, and the overall average rate observed.
Larger countries (e.g., the United States, Britain, and Germany) show
less volatility from year to year than smaller countries (e.g., Ireland
and Belgium). Between one-third and one-half of the countries show
a relatively flat profile or a slight decline over the period: Australia,
Germany, the United Kingdom, and Canada are most clearly in this
category, with Denmark, Ireland, and Finland showing more volatility
from year to year around a more or less unchanging mean. Procure-
20. See Letter from L. Roels, Transplant Coordinator, Univery Hospital Gasthuisberg, to bmj-
journals.com (July 27, 1998) (available at http://bmj.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/full/318/7180/
399/a?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&authorl=Roels&andorexactful
text=and&searchid=1138204591124_10914&FIRSTINDEX=0&sortspec=relevance&resource
type=l); L. Roels et al., Three Years of Experience With 'Presumed Consent' Legislation in
Belgium: Its Impact on Multi-Organ Donation in Comparison With Other European Countries, 23
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 903 (1991).
1026 [Vol. 55:1017
PRESUMED-CONSENT LAWS
uo!ellndod uO!ll!Uw Jad SJOUOp ouoapio
2006]
C -
1027
E
"0
.0
.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
ment rates in the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and Norway tend
to decline over time, though each of the latter three countries exper-
iences a short period of growth in the late 1990s that does not seem to
have been sustained in more recent years. By 2002, the procurement
rate in each of these countries had fallen back to or below the starting
point in 1990. In France, rates decline until 1997 and then steadily
increase thereafter. The United States shows slow but consistent
growth over the whole time period. The two most striking cases are
clearly Italy and Spain. Both of these countries show continuous,
rapid growth over the whole period. The main difference between
them is that Spain begins with the highest procurement rate (by far)
while Italy is initially the poorest performer after Australia.
Comparing the top and bottom rows of Figure 1 suggests that aver-
age procurement rates tend to be a little higher in countries with pre-
sumed-consent legislation than in those with informed-consent rules.
What might explain this difference? And what other factors should
predict national procurement rates?
C. How Might Presumed-Consent Laws Affect Procurement Rates?
There are three ways that presumed-consent laws might be associ-
ated with higher procurement rates. First, and most significantly, pre-
sumed-consent laws may allow for the next of kin's wishes simply to
be ignored in the procurement process, causing all potential donors to
become actual donors, with no loss due to refusals by the next of kin.
We now know, however, that this cannot be the right explanation. Al-
most all countries with presumed-consent laws allow for the next of
kin to be consulted and even to have a deciding say. Austria is the
only true exception, and perhaps also Belgium to a lesser degree.
Outside of Austria, any effect presumed-consent laws have cannot be
due to them removing families from the procurement process.
This does not mean these laws have no effect. A second possibility
is that presumed-consent laws function as a signaling device to the
population in general and next of kin in particular. Having a pre-
sumed-consent law shifts the question facing donors and especially
their families. Rather than being asked, "Can we have your permis-
sion to go ahead?" families are instead asked something like, "Do you
have any reason to think the donor would have objected?" This is a
small but significant shift. With respect to public opinion, in such a
system presumed-consent laws would express a social norm or collec-
tive expectation about the default course of action. Donation is still a
choice, but saying "yes" is assumed to be the standard option, rather
than a special decision for which consent must be specially sought. In
1028 [Vol. 55:1017
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the context of actual procurement requests, this means that the next
of kin retain the right to object, but their role in the decision process is
somewhat different. They must actively throw up an objection rather
than be approached as the sole arbiters of the outcome.
In the United States, the phrase "presumed consent" strongly con-
notes that the next of kin's wishes can be ignored or overridden, and
so this weaker interpretation might not seem to qualify as a presumed-
consent system at all. But, as Michael B. Gill argued, it does articulate
an important position, neglected in the United States debate, that falls
between strong-form presumed consent and the much weaker notion
of a required-request rule.21 A required-request system simply
obliges procurement coordinators to follow up on every potential do-
nor. From the next of kin's point of view, the burden of expectation is
not shifted in any way.22 Gill argued that there ought to be a pre-
sumption on everyone's part (a social norm, in other words) that or-
gans should be donated, even if the family still has the right to
object. 23 This does indeed shift the burden of expectation on families
and may make consent easier to obtain from families as a result.
The third reason that presumed-consent laws might be empirically
associated with higher procurement rates is because both are associ-
ated with some other important factor. Rather than being a causal
force in themselves, or the formal expression of an effective norm, it
might be that presumed-consent laws are simply a marker for other
practices that make organ procurement more efficient. We know
from the United States case that procurement organizations with
more resources and wider reach have higher procurement rates. 24
The historical development of transplant programs is often associated
with the work of organizational entrepreneurs (usually the transplant
surgeons) who mobilize resources in an effort to secure as many organ
donors as possible for the transplants they want to perform. 25 When
transplant advocates reorganize or expand a transplant system, they
are likely to invest in its infrastructure and personnel-providing new
facilities, more training, and so on-while also organizing publicity
21. See Michael B. Gill. Presumed Consent. Autonomy, and Organ Donation, 29 J. MED. &
PHIL. 37 (2004).
22. Indeed, required request laws were instituted in the United States in the 1980s to over-
come reluctance on the part of medical staff to ask about procurement, not to better encourage
next of kin to say "yes."
23. See Gill, supra note 21, at 55.
24. See Kieran Healy, Altruism as an Organizational Problem: The Case of Organ Procure-
ment, 69 AM. Soc. REV. 387, 387 (2004).
25. See ROBERTA G. SIMMONS ET AL., GiFT OF LIFE: THE SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IM-
PACT OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION (1997).
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campaigns and public policy initiatives. Presumed-consent legislation
might be a byproduct of such efforts, and might be the most visible
external marker of them, without itself contributing much to any sub-
sequent increase in procurement rates. In such circumstances, we
would still expect presumed-consent countries to do better than in-
formed-consent countries, but not because the law is directly interven-
ing in decisionmaking by donors. Rather, it is a proxy for other
factors that make a difference.
D. Other Factors Affecting Procurement Rates
Procurement rates are influenced by structural and organizational
forces other than the law. On the supply side, cadaveric organ pro-
curement is naturally limited by the supply of potential donors. Po-
tential donors are people who die in circumstances that make
donation possible in principle. Not all causes or circumstances of
death yield a potential donor. Many diseases rule candidates out of
consideration. Potential donors come most often from deaths caused
by cerebrovascular diseases (such as strokes or aneurysms) or road
accidents. 26 Other trauma cases, such as deaths due to falls, drowning,
or assault, are also a source of potential donors. Procurement organi-
zations do have some leeway at the margins: better-resourced systems
will be more able to locate road accident victims in time and stabilize
them in the hospital, for instance. But if a country simply has a lower
rate of road accident fatalities than average, or a higher rate of deaths
from cerebrovascular diseases, we should expect the procurement rate
to vary accordingly, all other things being equal.
In addition to these exogenous effects, organ procurement organi-
zations and transplant centers are part of wider systems of healthcare.
Features at both the organizational and macro-institutional levels
should affect procurement rates. The structure, staffing, and re-
sources of procurement organizations are vitally important aspects of
the transplant system, and evidence from the United States case sug-
gests these features may be the most important determinants of the
procurement rate. 27 We cannot easily measure these variables across
26. For data on causes, circumstances, and mechanisms of death, see Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network, Data, http://www.optn.org/data (last visited Jan. 25, 2006). In 2005,
20.1% of recovered donors died in a motor vehicle accident (MVA), the largest single category
outside of "natural causes" (28.8%); 43.5% suffered a stroke or other cerebrovascular injury, Id.
Note that MVAs are a circumstance of death while cerebrovascular injuries are a cause, so the
two figures should not be combined. MVA deaths are generally caused by head trauma injuries,
which accounted for 38.7% of donor deaths in 2005.
27. See HEALY, supra note 5; Healy, supra note 24, at 393-94.
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countries or over time. We can, however, control for some broader
features of each society that might be correlated with procurement.
Most simply, a country's per capita GDP ought to be positively as-
sociated with the procurement rate. Transplantation is carried on
mainly in wealthy countries, and the necessary infrastructure is expen-
sive to support. More specifically, we might also expect a country's
healthcare system and its level of healthcare spending to affect pro-
curement rates. But the direction of the relationship is not clear. Two
opposing possibilities suggest themselves. The first is that an inclusive
public healthcare system is a prerequisite for high procurement rates.
The idea is that the ultimate reliance of transplant systems on the gifts
of donors is more likely to be successful where there is a strong, col-
lective commitment to public health. The generalized reciprocity that
donation depends on-gifts from anonymous donors to unknown re-
cipients-might be more easily sustained in the context of a national
health service of some kind. This was a key part of Richard Titmuss's
argument in The Gift Relationship.28
Alternatively, it might be that a strong commitment to publicly
funded healthcare is associated with lower rates of organ procure-
ment, given the expensive and selective nature of donation. Organ
transplantation has become quite widespread in the past twenty years
and is poised for continued growth (or at least increasing demand). 29
But the cost and difficulty of the operation, and the life-long post-
transplant care needed by recipients, mean that transplantation is not
by any measure a form of basic healthcare. This suggests that while
wealthier countries should have higher procurement rates, high levels
of public spending on healthcare might be negatively associated with
higher procurement rates.
As this last point implies, the organizational and legal details of or-
gan procurement are embedded in broader institutional and cultural
features of societies, not just the healthcare system. The form and
extent of logistical support for donation will have evolved within par-
ticular systems of healthcare provision. Similarly, legal regimes gov-
erning transplants will not have emerged in a vacuum. Cases like
Japan, where transplants were taboo for many years, show that cul-
tural context can matter a great deal.30 Historical legacies in Ger-
28. See TITMUSS, supra note 3.
29. Since 1988, the number of individual patients on the waiting list for a transplant has grown
by an average rate of about ten percent per year. I arrived at this result by calculating the
numbers provided in the Organ Procurement and Transplant Network Annual Reports for 1998
and 2004.
30. See Margaret Lock, Deadly Disputes: Ideologies and Brain Death in Japan, in ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION: MEANINGS AND REALITIES 142 (Stuart J. Younger et al. eds., 1996).
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many have also made transplantation a complex public issue.31 I will
not pursue this question further here, though it certainly merits closer
analysis. For present purposes, our goal is to estimate the contribu-
tion of a country's legal regime to its procurement rate. We will do
this while controlling for two of the major inputs to the supply of po-
tential donors-death rates from road accidents and cerebrovascular
diseases-on the one hand, and two measures capturing the overall
wealth and commitment to public health spending for each country,
on the other.
III. DATA AND METHODS
The dependent variable for the quantitative analysis is the number
of cadaveric donors procured per million population for each of sev-
enteen OECD countries between 1990 and 2002. These data were
provided by Transplant Procurement Management (2004) and na-
tional organ procurement agencies. The independent variables-cov-
ering the same countries and time period-are the per capita GDP
(measured in dollars purchasing power parity), public health expendi-
ture as a percentage of GDP, the road accident fatality rate (per mil-
lion population), the death rate from cerebrovascular disease (per
million population), and the country's classification as a presumed-
consent or informed-consent regime. Figure 2 summarizes informa-
tion about the distribution of these variables.
Most countries can be easily assigned to a legal regime, having
passed the relevant legislation prior to the period under analysis.
Some countries passed new legislation between 1990 and 2002 that
reaffirmed or expanded the existing legal status of transplantation:
France and Italy passed new presumed-consent laws in 1990 and 1999,
respectively, superseding older presumed-consent laws dating from
the mid-1970s. Similarly, Germany passed new informed-consent leg-
islation in 1997 that continued its existing practices. As noted earlier,
Switzerland is classified as a presumed-consent country.
The cross-sectional, time-series structure of the data makes regular
ordinary least squares (OLS) methods inappropriate due to the clus-
tering of observations at the country level and the serial correlation of
within-country observations over time. Consent laws do not vary
within countries over the observed time period, so a fixed-effects for-
mulation is not applicable. In addition, there are likely to be unob-
served factors affecting the donation rate within each country. Both
31. See LINDA F. HOGLE, RECOVERING THE NATION'S BODY: CULTURAL MEMORY,
MEDICINE, AND THE POLrIcs OF REDEMPTION (1999).
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of these features make a hierarchical (or mixed-effects) model the
natural specification, with a random effect for each country. This
model takes the following form (Equation 1):
Yi = XiP +- Zibi + Ei, i = 1, .... , M,
where yj is the ni x 1 vector of donation rates in the ith country, Xi is
the ni x p model matrix for the fixed effects for observations in coun-
try i, 13 is the vector of fixed-effect coefficients, Zi is the ni x q model
matrix of random effects for observations in country i, and bi is the q x
1 vector of random-effect coefficients for country i. The random-ef-
fects coefficients are assumed to be distributed as follows (Equation
2):
bi - Nq(O,T),
where ' is the variance-covariance matrix for the random effects.
The error term in Equation 1, Ej, is characterized as follows (Equation
3):
-i - Nni(O,a 2Ai), i = 1, ... , M,
where o 2Ai is the covariance matrix for the errors in country i. Be-
cause the within-country observations are an annual time series, the
error structure is given by the first-order autoregressive process,
AR(1) (Equation 4):
Et  E + a,
where the current observation's error term is a linear function of the
previous observation, E,1 , plus a normally distributed noise term, a,.
Alternative model formulations (notably pooled time series or gen-
eralized least squares approaches) are also plausible, but are not
presented here. In a generalized least squares model, no country-level
random effect would be specified. Instead, the serial correlation of
the data and the within-country variance would be incorporated into
the error structure of the model. This approach gives what seem like
overly optimistic estimates of the fixed effects. Exploratory analysis
suggests that there is a high degree of within-country variation that is
not explained by our measures of death rates, GDP, or spending. As
we have seen, there is little existing research on the cross-national de-
terminants of organ donation, and such research as is available sug-
gests that subnational and organizational-level factors will matter a
great deal. The best methodological strategy is to incorporate the
likely presence of country-specific factors into the model as directly as
possible. The mixed-effects approach allows us to do this in a conve-
nient way. It may produce more conservative estimates of the fixed-
effects we are interested in (such as the presence of presumed-consent
1034 [Vol. 55:1017
PRESUMED-CONSENT LAWS
laws) than other specifications, but it better reflects the nested process
that generates the data we observe. 32
IV. RESULTS
Fixed-effects coefficients for a linear mixed-effects model are
presented in Table 2. Although the signs of the coefficients are in the
expected direction (with the exception of cerebrovascular deaths),
none are statistically significant. The effect of presumed-consent laws
is relatively large in magnitude, but is not statistically significant.
These weak results are somewhat surprising. Further exploration of
the model reveals that it does not fit the data well, and for a specific
reason. By examining a plot of the standardized residuals by country
(the left-hand panel of Figure 3), we can see that the observed data
from Spain and Italy are poorly explained by the model. 33 These are,
of course, the only two countries that have shown sustained, rapid
growth in their procurement rates through the 1990s. This makes
their profile quite different from other countries in the dataset-par-
ticularly the larger ones, which show comparatively modest patterns
of growth or decline. Our country-level predictors of procurement do
poorly as a consequence. This suggests that it is worth treating the
outlying cases separately. Before we examine these two cases in more
detail, we can look again at our model with Spain and Italy excluded
from the dataset.
TABLE 2
FIXED-EFFECTS COEFFICIENTS FROM A LINEAR MIXED-
EFFECTS MODEL OF DONOR PROCUREMENT
Value Std.Error DF t-value
(Intercept) 14.706 1.42 180 10.33
GDP 0.005 0.00 180 0.40
Health -0.683 0.53 180 -1.29
Roads 0.018 0.02 180 1.17
C/Vasc -0.004 0.00 180 -0.79
Presumed Consent 3.185 1.97 15 1.62
AIC: 885.5. BIC: 914.9. Log-likelihood: -433.7. Country-level random effects fitted but not
shown. Variables are centered on their means. GDP coefficient is multiplied by one hundred.
32. See generally Josg PINHEIRO & DOUGLAS M. BATES, MIXED EFFECTS MODELS IN S AND
S-PLUS (2000). The models were fit using restricted maximum likelihood with the "nlme" li-
brary. Figures were produced with Deepayan Sarkar's Lattice Graphics and Frank E. Harrell's
Hmisc: Harrell Miscellaneous software packages for R.
33. The residuals can be thought of as reflecting the difference between what the model
predicts and what we actually observed. Standardized residuals ought to be evenly distributed
around zero for each country. If they are not, this is evidence that the model does not fit the
data for that country very well.
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TABLE 3
FIXED-EFFECTS COEFFICIENTS FROM A LINEAR MIXED-EFFECTS
MODEL OF DONOR PROCUREMENT, ITALY AND SPAIN EXCLUDED
Value Std.Error DF t-value
(Intercept) 15.131 0.89 158 16.92
GDP 0.012 0.00 158 2.03
Health -0.590 0.33 158 -1.79
Roads 0.036 0.01 158 3.19
C/Vasc 0.006 0.00 158 2.03
Presumed Consent 2.516 1.31 13 1.93
AIC: 736. BIC: 764.3. Log-likelihood: -359. Country-level random effects fitted but not shown.
Variables are centered on their means. GDP coefficient is multiplied by 100.
Table 3 shows the fixed-effects coefficients for the same model as
before, this time excluding data from Spain and Italy. The results are
a good deal better-GDP, road fatalities, and cerebrovascular deaths
all have positive and significant effects on the procurement rate, as
predicted. Road fatalities make a much larger contribution to the
procurement rate than do deaths from cerebrovascular diseases. This
may be because road accident victims are converted into donors more
efficiently. Although not quite significant at conventional levels, the
negative effect of health spending is quite large-a two-point change
in health spending as a percentage of GDP is associated with roughly
a one-point drop in the procurement rate. The effect of the legal re-
gime is also large. A presumed-consent regime is worth an additional
2.7 donors per million population, when other variables are at their
mean values. The right-hand panel of Figure 3 confirms that the
model fits the data better with Spain and Italy excluded.
This analysis first suggests that when all of the available data is
taken into account, the presence of presumed-consent laws does not
make a material difference to the procurement rate one way or the
other. But the analysis is not unique in this regard-other variables
expected to be positively associated with the procurement rate have
no measurable effects either. On the other hand, the presence of two
countries with rapidly growing procurement rates makes the statistical
model fit quite poorly. If Spain and Italy are set aside, our model
does better. The "supply-side" measures of the death rate are positive
and significant (particularly the road fatality rate). Richer countries
procure more donors, in line with our expectations. Countries with a
higher share of public health spending seem to procure fewer donors.
The effect of presumed-consent laws is positive, though neither of
these effects is strongly significant at conventional levels.
1036 [Vol. 55:1017
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A. Spain and Italy
If we focus on the overall percentage change in the procurement
rate over the past twelve years, the distinctive status of Spain and Italy
becomes very clear. Figure 4 shows the percentage change in the pro-
curement rate for each country by taking the mean procurement rate
from 1990-1994 as the start point and the 1998-2002 mean rate as the
end point. Countries with zero net change score a zero in this figure.
The median change across all countries was a decline in the average
procurement rate of about 4.75 percent. Half the countries fall some-
where between a decline of about fifteen percent and an increase of
about two percent. Countries showing only modest growth or a net
decline are split more or less evenly between presumed- and in-
formed-consent regimes. As the more formal model confirms, pre-
sumed-consent countries may do slightly better on the average, but in
general the differences are small. The biggest losers are Switzerland
and Sweden among presumed-consent countries, and Australia and
the Netherlands among informed-consent countries. Procurement
rates in all four of these countries declined by about twenty percent
from the early 1990s to the early 2000s. By contrast, Belgium (pre-
sumed consent) and the United States (informed consent) show fairly
steady growth. But the cases of Spain and especially Italy stand out
here, with growth rates far greater than any other countries. Spain
has long been known for its successful organ procurement program.
Already a leader at the beginning of the 1990s, it procured fifty-five
percent more organs at the end of the period than it did at the begin-
ning. Italy's growth-about 175 percent over the period-has been
astonishing. Unlike Spain, it began the 1990s as one of the poorest-
performing countries, but by 2002 had moved to the upper half of the
distribution.
Spain successfully reorganized its procurement system in the early
1990s and has seen a substantial increase in donation rates since then.
It is the country most frequently cited as the exemplary presumed-
consent regime-the "Spanish model." Its continued growth is not
easily explained in terms of the unchanging laws governing donation.
The evidence strongly suggests that other factors are responsible for
this success and shows decisively that the strongest form of presumed
consent (with no next-of-kin veto) is not practiced. Instead, invest-
ment in hospitals and procurement organizations is responsible for the
sustained growth. R. Matesanz and colleagues discussed the overhaul
of the Spanish system:
In each potential donor hospital there is a transplant coordination
team that is responsible for the whole process of organ procure-
1038 [Vol. 55:1017
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ment, from the detection of the donor to the organ grafting or tissue
banking. Annual rate of cadaveric donors rose from 14.3 per mil-
lion population (pmp) in 1989 to 21.7 donors pmp in 1992. Organ
retrieval rate increased by 81% during the same period. Renal,
liver and cardiac transplants increased by 44%, 175% and 162% re-
spectively. We conclude that this particular approach to the prob-
lea hs bee, s,,ccessfu in ,overcoming obstal u1. ,
untrained or undertrained requesting staff, unidentified donors, and
reluctance to approach grieving families. 34
A more recent account by this author confirms this view, emphasiz-
ing the positive effects of training and organizational innovation in
34. R. Matesanz et al., Organ Procurement in Spain: Impact of Transplant Coordination, 8
CLINICAL TRANSPLANTATION 281, 281 (1994).
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improving the consent rate: a proactive donor detection program per-
formed by well trained transplant coordinators, the introduction of
systematic death audits in hospitals, and the combination of a positive
social atmosphere with adequate economic reimbursement for the
hospitals have accounted for this success. 35
Similarly, George J. Chang and colleagues described the success of
the Spanish Model not in terms of presumed-consent laws but as a
matter of organizational innovation:
The so-called "Spanish Model" has been outlined as a structure of
national, regional, and local or in-hospital efforts to increase organ
donation. The management structure consists of a front-line in-hos-
pital transplant coordinator who is fully involved and accountable
for the donor recruitment effort. Furthermore, transplant donor co-
ordination has been "professionalized" and most coordinators are
qualified doctors, mainly intensive care specialists and nephrolo-
gists, who have dedicated time allocated to transplant coordination.
Moreover, the Spanish system adheres to the principles of decen-
tralization of the donor coordination effort through the use of re-
gional coordinators and the establishment of organ procurement as
the main priority for national, regional, and hospital coordinators. 36
Chang found that a substantial portion of the improvement in dona-
tion rates in Spain is due to increases in the use of older donors who
previously would not have been considered viable candidates for pro-
curement. A study by J. Rosel and colleagues tried to identify "vari-
ables [that influenced] a family member's decision to donate. ' 37 They
found that for seventy-one cases in hospital in Malaga, the "the man-
ners and approach of the doctors" to the donor families played a sig-
nificant role in obtaining consent from donor families. Matesanz
described the system in further detail:
The Spanish Model also includes a great effort in continuous medi-
cal training and education for new and old transplant coordinators
financed and directed by the central Health Administration, includ-
ing various training programs for health professionals, specifically
dedicated to every step of the process (donor detection and man-
agement, legal aspects, family approach, organizational aspects,
management of resources, and so on).
.... Spain has a theoretical presumed consent law, but, from a prac-
tical point of view, family consent is always requested and the
35. R. Matesanz, A Decade of Continuous Improvement in Cadaveric Organ Donation: The
Spanish Model, 21 NEFROLOOIA 59 (2001).
36. George J. Chang et al., Expanding the Donor Pool: Can the Spanish Model Work in the
United States?, 3 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1259, 1259 (2003) (internal citations omitted).
37. J. Rosel et al., Discriminant Variables Between Organ Donors and Nondonors: A Post Hoc
Investigation, 90 J. TRANSPLANT COORDINATION 50, 50 (1999). Similar studies have been carried
out in the United States. See, e.g., Siminoff et al., supra note 9.
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wishes of the relatives are always respected, as happens in practi-
cally all European Union countries. In fact, family refusal rates
have remained stable between 20% and 25% during the last few
years. What is clear is that the increased organ donation during the
1990s cannot be attributed to any change in Spanish legislation,
which has remained unmodified since 1979[.]38
Reports of the Spanish case strongly suggest that improved dona-
tion rates are due to substantial investment in the logistics of organ
procurement-better training, clear delegation of responsibility, a
strong presence in hospitals-rather than a change in the legal defini-
tion of donation or an unprompted sea change in public opinion.
Consent laws are not responsible for Spain's high rate of organ
donation.
Italy's experience is less well documented, in part because the rapid
rise in its procurement rate has been a more recent phenomenon than
in Spain. The available sources make it clear, however, that regional
transplant authorities in Italy have explicitly copied the Spanish ap-
proach to procurement, with similar results. Matesanz argued that
"Italy has probably been the country that has adopted more elements
of the Spanish Model and worked more seriously in this direction"
than any other.39 Bruno Simini reported that:
Tuscany alone doubled its organ donation rate to 26.9 dpmi in the
space of just one year. "Tuscany", said [transplant director Alessan-
dro] Nannicosta, "achieved in one year what northern regions
achieved in 4 or 5 years, after adopting the Spanish model for organ
donation". This model relies upon "local transplant co-ordinators
and excellent training of all staff involved. ''40
Data on regional trends within Italy bear out these reports. Growth
in the procurement rate since 1999 has been unevenly distributed
within the country. Southern regions have performed significantly
worse than northern ones on the average. Procurement rates in
northern provinces such as Piemonte or Emilia-Romagna are typically
twice or even three times as high as those in Calabria or Sicily.41
Amongst the central regions, Tuscany, Marches, and also Sardinia in-
38. R. Matesanz, Factors That Influence the Development of an Organ Donation Program, 36
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 739, 740 (2004).
39. Id. at 741.
40. See Bruno Simini, Tuscany Doubles Organ-Donation Rates by Following Spanish Example,
355 THE LANCET 476 (Feb. 5, 2000). Similarly, Bozzi and colleagues described part of Tuscany's
pilot program as "based on a database elaborated by the Transplant Coordination Office of the
Pisa University, according to the Spanish program of the National Transplant Organization." G.
Bozzi et al., Summary: The Quality Improvement Program in Organ Donation of the Tuscany
Region, 36 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 424 (2004).
41. See Associazione Italiana per la Donazione di Organi, Tessuti e Cellule, http://www.aido.it
(last visited Nov. 17, 2005) (providing regional data).
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creased their procurement rates rapidly between 2000 and 2003.42
The results of the quantitative analysis, together with more detailed
reports about individual countries, suggest that overall average levels
of organ donation are partly explained by supply-side considerations
and stable structural features of societies (perhaps including the nomi-
nal legal regime governing procurement). At the same time, dynamic
growth in procurement rates depends mainly on "middle-range"
changes, notably infrastructural investment and organizational
reform.
V. CONCLUSION
Cadaveric organ procurement is a complicated kind of gift, because
the next of kin or family are the de facto givers. Faced with this fact,
presumed-consent laws have been an attractive solution to some be-
cause they promise to remove the next of kin from the decision and so
guarantee a boost in the procurement rate. There has been considera-
ble debate about the ethics of this policy, speculation about a possible
backlash in public opinion should it be implemented, and anecdotal
evidence about its success in other countries. Yet there has been vir-
tually no research on whether these laws work as advertised. As this
Article has shown, presumed-consent laws typically do not remove the
next of kin from the procurement process. In all but one or perhaps
two cases in western countries, the family's right of refusal is retained.
This fact alone vitiates the standard case for presumed consent, at
least insofar as it credits higher procurement rates to the elimination
of the next of kin's veto. Yet there is more to the problem than this.
Presumed-consent countries do in fact perform a little better on aver-
age than informed-consent countries. I have argued that this is not
because of any direct effect of the law on individual choices. Rather,
countries with presumed-consent laws are more likely to have paid
close attention to the social organization of their transplant systems.
High-yield cases like Spain and Italy stand out not because their legal
systems mandate a different kind of choice for donors, nor because
they offer some special incentives for donor families or next of kin.
Instead, they have invested effectively in the logistics of the transplant
system: they put more staff on the ground, trained them better (espe-
cially in the crucial process of requesting consent from families), and
improved coordination between the different actors and agencies in
the procurement process. Recent research shows that similar reforms
may boost donation rates in United States organ procurement organi-
42. Id.
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zations.43 This result is encouraging-it suggests that there is room
for programs to improve their performance. Organizations are easier
to change than baseline death rates, the entire healthcare system, or
the cultural traditions of a whole country.
The organizational underpinnings of donor procurement have been
neglected in debates about the future of organ and tissue donation.
This is unfortunate but perhaps not surprising. In the United States
and elsewhere, these debates are dominated by the division between
market- and gift-based exchange. Our stylized images of how these
institutions ought to look (and how they should differ) lead us to as-
sume more than we really know about the empirical cases. As a con-
sequence, variation amongst actually existing procurement systems is
not well understood, or simply not investigated. Instead, countries are
classified as all being of the same gift-based type, and then contrasted
with the supposed (usually hypothetical) commercial alternative.
Thus, substantial differences in performance between countries are
masked. Arguments about altruism versus self-interest and disputes
over presumed and informed consent together constitute a good por-
tion of the public discussion about organ donation. Yet neither debate
helps us explain why some countries have many more organ donors
than others. As best we can tell, countries with high procurement
rates do not owe their success to any distinctive legal conception of
consent, nor to any special way of institutionalizing exchange in
human goods. Rather, more fine-grained organizational differences-
specifically in logistics and process management-are responsible for
their success.
43. See Robert M. Sade et al., Increasing Organ Donation: A Successful New Concept, 74
TRANSPLANTATION 1142 (2002).
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